Skip to content

Political Party Ban in Greece – Thoughts after Supreme Special Court Decisions 9 and 10/2025

Avatar for Anna Tsiftsoglou

By Anna Tsiftsoglou In:

Print |

Share

 

  1. Can Party Bans be allowed in Greece?1

A rather neglected provision, that of article 29.1 of the Greek Constitution, concerning the right to found and join political parties, has been in vogue during the past decade in Greece. The original cause of such revival was the infamous case of the far-right Golden Dawn party and its various successors, like the Hellenes and the Spartans parties, members of which attempted, following the first-instance criminal conviction of the Golden Dawn leadership, to run for the 2023 parliamentary elections in the country. Following two recent Supreme Special Court (ΑΕΔ) Decisions 9 and 10/2025 with which three Spartans Members of Parliament (MPs) were removed from parliamentary office, I question both the rationality of the recent legislative choices made to treat the far-right phenomenon as well as the Court’s position on such a crucial democratic affair. It is supported that, under the present Constitution, an electoral ban of political parties in Greece is both unconstitutional and erroneous for the rule of law. Moreover, its judicial enforcement has proven problematic, too, leading the country and the political system to dangerous pathways in the future.

  1. Constitutional Boundaries and the 1975 Liberal take

Article 29 of the Hellenic Constitution (1975-date) represents one of its most liberal provisions 2 . In particular, Paragraph 1 establishes the political right of Greek citizens possessing the right to vote to freely found and join political parties, ‘the organization and activity of which must serve the free functioning of democratic government’. This clause enshrines the will and the vision of the 1975 constitutional legislator for political parties. Article 29 makes no reference whatsoever to party ban in Greece, judicially or otherwise, but solely to the democratic organization and activity of political parties. Thus, compared to other European Constitutions, such as the German Basic Law, the Greek one is deliberately silent on the possibility of party bans.

Such choice was not random. Article 29 has an interesting historical background. In 1974, after the fall of the military dictatorship (‘junta’) and Greece’s return to parliamentary democracy (‘metapolitefsi’), the former experience of banning the Greek communist party for much of the 20th century was still fresh 3 . Moreover, within the general atmosphere of renewal and reform spirit that characterized that Constitutional Assembly, the very idea of party bans could not withstand. Interestingly, while the addition of a German Grundgesetz –style party ban was originally proposed, eventually it was abandoned, much like the addition of a reservation of law to the clause 4 . Militant democracy 5 , as it was experienced for much of the 20th Century Greek history, and largely associated with the ban of communist parties 6 , was considered a thing of the past under the rise of liberalism and political pluralism.

In Greece, over the past 50 plus years since the establishment of the 1975 Constitution, article 29.1 has remained unsurpassed. Despite the numerous constitutional revisions that followed since (1986, 2001, 2008 and 2019), the Greek legislator, even after the traumatic Golden Dawn experience during the past decade, has never amended this clause. Thus, any discussion about establishing party bans in the country must conform to the existing constitutional boundaries. Most importantly, the clause should be interpreted under the light of the principle of democracy and in conjunction with established voting rights. Given that the clause lacks any reservation of law, the common legislator cannot restrict electoral rights disproportionately, by means of an electoral ban, unless the Constitution so provides, e.g. when a candidate has been criminally convicted irrevocably for certain felonies.

  1. The Rise of the Far-Right during the Greek financial crisis and its Criminal Treatment

Much of that original liberal position of the 1975 Constitution has been questioned ever since the rise of the far-right -and the Golden Dawn (GD) in particular- in Greece during the period of the financial crisis (2010s).

The popular discontent that followed the country’s austerity period led to the fall of bipartisanism, parliamentary fragmentation and the rise of new political forces. In the twin 2012 General Elections the Golden Dawn made its dynamic parliamentary entry gaining an impressive 7% of the total vote and rapidly becoming the third political force in the country 7 . Only a year later, in late 2013, the criminal investigation of the party leadership and members followed, primarily on charges of constituting a criminal organization; the immediate suspension of the party’s state funding (solely due to its criminal prosecution) by an ad personam law ultimately ruled constitutional 8 ; and the First Instance conviction of GD’s leadership in 2020 9 . Recently, in March 2026 the Athens Criminal Court of Appeals upheld that ruling and reaffirmed the party’s status as a paramilitary criminal organization.

During the years that followed the 42 GD MPs’ 2020 first instance conviction and imprisonment, the party’s political momentum was obviously limited, but not extinguished. Despite their imprisonment, former GD MPs could still claim their constitutionally entrenched electoral rights, run for office and get elected until their criminal conviction became irrevocable. After GD’s failure in the 2019 General Elections and a principal disagreement with GD founder and former president Nikos Mihaloliakos, former GD MP Ilias Kasidiaris founded his own far-right party Ellines (the Greeks) in June 2020. Only a few months before the First Instance criminal conviction of Kasidiaris and the rest of the party’s leadership, Ellines was founded as a successor party to the GD and with the clear target to enter the Hellenic parliament in the next General Elections.

  1. The Weaponization of Electoral Law as a Political Response to the Far Right

Watching the steady rise of the far-right at the polls, despite the GD’s electoral failure and criminal conviction, the Greek legislator attempted to marginalize it, using electoral law as a powerful weapon of political control. In early 2023, a few months ahead of that year’s General Elections, two succeeding laws were voted 10  to allow the electoral ban of political parties whose leadership, official or ‘de facto’ 11 , had been convicted for certain crimes, even by a First Instance Court. Moreover, parties or coalitions of candidates whose ‘action does not serve the free function of democratic government’ could be banned from elections, thus adding a normative aspect to the long-held solely programmatic clause of art.29.1C.

Moreover, the judgment as to who the true or actual leader of a political party really was has been entrusted to Areios Pagos, the Supreme Civil and Criminal Court in Greece. The latter, traditionally assigned the sole administrative task of checking party statutes to formally approve electoral participation, was elevated to the ultimate arbiter of political life. Areios Pagos is legitimized by electoral law – not the Constitution- to exercise ex ante substantial review to approve candidates. To serve its new elevated role, albeit within strict time limits (only a month before the Elections), Areios Pagos may ask for and receive documentation on a party’s function from judicial or other authorities, while other parties may assist the court by submitting relevant evidence to extinguish their political opponents.

In sum, as if the existing criminal law mechanisms weren’t enough, electoral law was weaponized and modified fast, under the pressure of political expediency, in order to easily ban GD and its successors from elections, and thus from the political sphere at large. Nevertheless, the Greek legislator facilitated an unprecedented witch hunt game which, in addition to being unconstitutional, may poison political life across the political spectrum and democracy at large. Contrary to the original -and still strong- liberal position of the Greek Constitution on political parties, electoral law introduced militant democracy to the country for the first time since 1975. And that, without any prior constitutional revision.

  1. From The Ellines (2023) to the Spartans (2025) cases

When Areios Pagos was called to apply the revised electoral law for the first time, it proceeded to ban both Ellines and a similar ultra right-wing coalition (Ellines for the Motherland and Freedom) from participating in the 2023 Twin General Elections 12 .

The Supreme Civil and Penal Court of Greece based its opinions not merely on the applicants’ statutes but also on their actual operation, leadership and political behavior. Moreover, the Court had to specify abstract terms like the ‘true leadership’ of the party performing a substantial review for the first time, within very strict time limits. Areios Pagos considered in both cases that the party/coalition’s structure and activity effectively continued the political and organizational practices associated with Golden Dawn, citing criminal convict Kasidiaris as their ‘actual’ leader.

Surprisingly, the Court abandoned its former case law 13  on political parties that rejected any legislative or judicial restrictions to their free function. Areios Pagos had formerly acknowledged the absence of any reservation of law on Article 29.1C or any restrictions to the right to found or join political parties based on a party’s ideology or otherwise, in order to prevent legislative or judicial interventions on their democratic action. In the Ellines cases, Areios Pagos made a complete shift and acknowledged the existence of a ‘silent’ reservation of law on Article 29.1C allowing the common legislator to introduce militant democracy mechanisms. The Court thus leveraged its elevated role to make maximalistic interpretations of the Constitution, by pronouncing the indisputable existence of militant democracy mechanisms in the Greek Constitution that had never been judicially pronounced for almost 50 years. Areios Pagos based this interpretational shift to the ‘change of circumstances’ that called for preemptive action, thus substituting the clear will of the constitutional legislator 14 . Furthermore, citing ECtHR jurisprudence 15  the Court majority held that electoral exclusion may be a less restrictive measure compared to party dissolution, if all the standards set by the Strasbourg Court in certain extreme such cases are respected.

Contrary to Areios Pagos, the Supreme Special Court performs a posteriori review of the legality of Elections. Under Article 100C, this specialized tribunal inter alia hears objections against the validity or the verification of Elections, it may remove MPs from office and resolve conflicts and disputes on constitutionality issues between Greece’s three high courts (Council of State, Areios Pagos and the Court of Audit).

In the 2025 ‘Spartans’ cases 16 , the Supreme Special Court had to review electoral objections concerning four Spartans MPs (three elected and one substitute), including  party leader Vasileios Stigkas. Particularly, it had to examine whether their 2023 General Election was won by misleading voters about the party’s real leadership. The key issue, like in the Ellines Cases, was whether the formal party leadership concealed the decisive political role of Ilias Kasidiaris. The Supreme Special Court, following Areios Pagos’ reasoning, held that Kasidiaris had in fact exerted enormous political influence on the Spartans, too, and in fact served as the true guide of the party. Thus, since voters had been defrauded, and despite the fact that the criminal court had already acquitted all Spartans MPs and Kasidiaris on such charges, three Spartans MPs’ election had to be annulled, per the Special Court.

The Spartans’ cases intensified the debate on judicial intervention in politics. They also highlighted the constitutional limits regarding electoral bans. The Supreme Special Court, like Areios Pagos, also makes similar maximalistic interpretations of the Constitution so as to acknowledge the existence of militant democracy mechanisms, contrary to the prevailing readings of Article 29.1A. The Court in fact takes militant democracy for granted, and seems to refuse to see the real impact of an electoral ban, treating electoral participation as a separate, albeit the most crucial, aspect of a party’s political existence. An electoral ban practically breaches the core of a party’s political existence (Art.29.1 in conjunction with art. 51.3C permitting voting rights restrictions). Most importantly, the Spartans cases showed the impact of an electoral reform made under the pressure of political expediency: three MP seats had to be vacated but could not be filled, under current legislation, ultimately leaving a 300-seat parliament with 297 MPs. That has created far more problems than it supposedly tried to solve (e.g. on parliamentary procedures, or on electoral representation).

In sum, both High Courts, particularly Areios Pagos, surpassed their institutional roles displaying ‘reverse’ judicial activism – towards depriving applicants of their fundamental political rights- and interpreting the Constitution in total breach with the past and, most importantly, in total breach with the wording and the spirit of the 1975 Constitution 17 .

  1. Beyond Militant Democracy in Greece

In conclusion, given the present constitutional structure, since article 29.1 has been unaltered for over 50 years, a legislative party ban -even in the form of an electoral ban- in Greece is both unconstitutional and erroneous for the rule of law. Moreover, its judicial enforcement proves to be also institutionally problematic, as evidenced by the recent Supreme Court case law. Making institutional leaps forward, like with electoral party bans, that breach fundamental political rights of citizens without explicit constitutional foundations, and, most importantly, that treat the electorate paternalistically, erode the very fabric of the rule of law in Greece. Instead of letting the electorate choose and vote its parliamentary representatives on its free will, such electoral bans have ousted from Elections, and thus from the epicenter of the political sphere, not merely candidates but political parties altogether on unsolid grounds (like the ‘actual leadership’ of the party). Moreover, the legislator has failed by assigning this role to a Court that lacks both the time and the institutional capacity to make such substantial assessments prior to the Elections.

Two other options seem to be more sustainable in the future. Firstly, a possible constitutional revision of article 29.1C that would specifically allow (electoral) party bans on very strictly defined conditions, and would allocate this task to a particular institution (Specialized Court or other), leaving the common legislator to regulate the details 18 . Such constitutional revision has not yet been proclaimed on the recent announcements of the present government (as of June 2026). However, adding the possibility of preemptive party bans to the Constitution would require a longer-term assessment of the impact of such an institutional change, instead of the short-term assessments of the kind made recently by the Greek common legislator, under the General Election polls pressure. Even in countries like Germany that have adopted such militant democracy mechanisms they have proved inefficient and have been applied rarely 19 . Otherwise, sticking to the mechanisms of criminal law and criminal procedure, rather than weaponizing electoral law, and letting people instead of the Courts have the final political word, seems to be more democratically sustainable 20  as a means to manage the enemies of a democracy.

At the end of the day, the harm suffered by our parliamentary democracy by infusing illegitimate militant democracy mechanisms on our political system is far greater than the harm any fascist, neo-nazi or other extreme ideology candidates may cause. The three empty seats in our Parliament offer some food for thought for the future.

  1. This blog post is based on an oral presentation made at the ‘Militant Democracy and the Rule of Law’ Roundtable co-organized by the International Association of Constitutional Law (IACL-AIDC), the Association of Greek Constitutionalists and the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Faculty of Law on May 22-23, 2026.
  2. See generally Ev.Venizelos, Constitutional Law Lessons, 3rd ed., Sakkoulas 2021, 423, C.Chrysogonos, Constitutional Law, 3rd ed., Sakkoulas 2022, 322, Y.Drossos, The Legal Position of Political Parties in Greece (PhD thesis republished), CECL 2023, 209, H.Anthopoulos, Political Parties and Democracy, Efimerida Dioikitikou Dikaiou 2/2025, 157, G.Karavokyris, Article 29 in: The Hellenic Constitution: Interpretation per article, www.SyntagmaWatch.gr 2023 (all bibliographic sources available in Greek)
  3. See particularly N.Alivizatos, The Constitution and its Enemies in Modern Greek History, Polis 2011, 375, 489, Sp.Vlahopoulos, The Legislative Decree 59/1974 on the Formation and Reoperation of Political Parties in: Vlahopoulos/Hatzivasileiou, Dilemmas of Greek Constitutional History – 20th Century, Patakis 2018, 303, H.Kouroundis, From surpassing the Post-Civil War Trauma to the Fascist Threat – Old and novel Interpretations of Article 29 par.1C, Dikaiomata tou Anthropou 99/2024, 137 (all sources in Greek)
  4. H.Kouroundis, supra note 3, at 141.
  5. See generally K.Loewenstein. Militant democracy and fundamental rights, I. American political science review 31.3 (1937): 417-432, G. Capoccia, Militant democracy: The institutional bases of democratic self-preservation. Annual Review of Law and Social Science 9.1 (2013): 207-226, J-W Müller. Protecting popular self-government from the people? New normative perspectives on militant democracy. Annual review of political science 19.1 (2016): 249-265.
  6. Y.Drossos, supra note 2, at 98.
  7. See analytically A.Tsiftsoglou, Of Democracy and other Fables: The 2012 Greek Parliamentary Elections in: L.Vicente/H.Micklitz (eds.), Interdisciplinary Research: Are We Asking the Right Questions in Legal Research? EUI Law Working Paper 2015/04
  8. Symvoulio tis Epikrateias (StE) 518/2015 (Plenary session), which ruled inter alia that the relevant photographic provision is not contrary to the principles of equality, separation of powers or proportionality, and does not breach articles 1 and 3 of Protocol No.1 to the ECHR.
  9. A’ Trimeles Efeteio Kakourgimaton Athinon 2644/2020
  10. Laws 5019 and 5043/2023, modifying Presidential Decree 26/2012 (Electoral Law) art.32. See also Law 4804/2021 prohibiting a criminally convicted person, even by a First Instance Court and not irrevocably, to lead a political party or a party coalition in Greece
  11. ‘De facto’ or ‘true’ leadership of a political party refers to the case whereby a person other than the official leader or formal representative of the party appears to either lead the party or has appointed a virtual leader or retains the leading political role towards the Electorate (per art. 32 para 1 b’ of the modified Electoral Law).
  12. Areios Pagos (Civil-Section A1), Decisions 8/2023 and 95/2023 respectively.
  13. Areios Pagos (Civil-Section A1), Decisions 590/2009 and 65/2014
  14. On the contrary, see particularly the case comment of I.Tassopoulos, Constitutional Theory and Article 29.1C, E-Politeia, Vol.9/2024, 23-29 (supporting the view that Areios Pagos Decision 8/2023 does not alter the long-held interpretation of article 29.1C, despite its references to the change of circumstances)
  15. European Court of Human Rights, Party for a Democratic Society (DTP) and others v. Turkey, 3840/10, 12.1.2016, 101; YAZAR and Others v. Turkey, 22723-5/93, 9.4.2002, 49. See also United Communist Party of Turkey and others v. Turkey, 19392/92, 30.1.1998 and Refah Partisi and others v. Turkey, 41340/98, 13.2.2003 which set the standards for the dissolution and electoral prohibition of political parties.
  16. Supreme Special Court, Decisions 9 and 10/2025
  17. See particularly the criticisms of S.Rizos, Party Bans: The constitutional problem of Elections, 28.04.2023, H.Tsiliotis, The Supreme Special Court decisions on the annulment of the 3 Spartans MPS election. One more constitutional challenge by the judicial branch. 15.07.2025, Sp.Vlachopoulos, Political parties and elections- Bans and democracy, 14.09.2023 and (all in www.Syntagmawatch.gr and in Greek)
  18. See also L.Papadopoulou, Is there a need to revise Art.29.1C? in: Proposals for Constitutional Revision – Parliament, Dianeosis, May 2025 (in Greek)
  19. See e.g. T.G.Daly/B.C.Jones, Parties vs democracy: Addressing today’s political party threats to democratic rule, ICON, 18:509-538, 2020 (for a comparative overview in Europe), A.Malkopoulou, Greece: A Procedural Defence of Democracy against the Golden Dawn, European Constitutional Law Review, 17:177-121, 2021, A.Kouroutakis, Against Militant Democracy, German Law Journal, 26:979-997, 2025
  20. See e.g. K.Chrysogonos, The Fascist Paradox, Dikaiomata tou Anthropou 66/2015,749, 776 (in Greek)
Tagged as
Law and Governance South East Europe Konrad Adenaurer Stiftung - Rule of Law - South East Europe © 2026 Law and Governance South East Europe
All rights reserved.