Bosnia’s Dodik Case: A “Victory” for the Rule of Law

The conviction of Milorad Dodik, the then president of Republika Srpska (RS), by the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina on February 26th , 2025,¹ which was upheld in totality by the appellate chamber of the same court on June 12th, 2025,² represents both a watershed moment and a cautionary tale for the rule of law in post-war Bosnia. While the court’s final verdict demonstrated that even the most powerful political figures are not above the law, the subsequent events have revealed the profound challenges facing Bosnia’s judicial institutions when confronting entrenched political resistance.

The Legal Framework and Criminal Conviction

The case against Dodik centred on his violation of Article 203a of the Criminal Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina, ³ which criminalizes the non-implementation of decisions by the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina. This provision was added through amendments enacted by the High Representative Christian Schmidt on July 1, 2023, ⁴ creating a new criminal offence targeting officials who fail to comply with High Representative decisions.

Dodik’s conviction stemmed from events in July 2023, when he signed two presidential decrees despite explicit decisions by High Representative Christian Schmidt to prevent these unconstitutional laws from taking effect.⁵The laws in question were the Law on Non-Application of Decisions of the Constitutional Court of BiH and the Law on Amendments to the Law on Publication of Laws and Other Regulations of Republika Srpska.⁶ By signing these decrees on July 7, 2023, Dodik directly contravened the High Representative’s July 1 decisions and enabled the publication of the contested laws in the Official Gazette of Republika Srpska.

In its first instance verdict, the Court of BiH had to give answers to some delicate legal questions which are the result of Bosnia’s specific constitutional arrangements. First of all, it found that Dodik held the required status as a public official under Article 1(3) of the Criminal Code of BiH, ⁷ and that his actions constituted the criminal act of non-application and non-implementation. Crucially, the court determined that Dodik acted with direct intent, citing evidence including his public speech on July 2, 2023, where he explicitly stated his intention not to respect the High Representative’s decisions.⁸

The Defence Arguments and Court’s Reasoning

The defence raised several constitutional and procedural challenges that the court methodically addressed. First, they argued that Christian Schmidt lacked legal authority as High Representative, claiming he was not properly appointed according to international law. The Court of BiH firmly rejected this argument, relying on established jurisprudence from both the Constitutional Court of BiH and the European Court of Human Rights.⁹ The Court of BiH noted that the High Representative is appointed by the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) Steering Board, a practice aligned with UN Security Council resolutions beginning with Resolution 1031 (1995).¹⁰Christian Schmidt’s official appointment by the PIC Steering Board on May 27, 2021, was communicated to the UN Secretary-General, who later confirmed the PIC’s competence in such appointments.¹¹

Second, the defence argued that Dodik was constitutionally obligated to sign the decrees under Article 80 (4) of the RS Constitution.¹²The court clarified that this obligation only applies when laws are re-adopted by the National Assembly after presidential return.¹³ Since the High Representative’s decisions had already taken effect, Dodik was actually obligated to return the laws for reconsideration rather than sign them.

Third, addressing claims about the authenticity of the Dayton Agreement, the court referenced Article 10(b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,¹⁴ which establishes that treaty authenticity can be confirmed through initials when no other authentication procedure exists. The court noted that Yugoslavia ratified the complete agreement in 2002,¹⁵ further confirming its validity.

The Institutional Standoff

The court sentenced Dodik to one year imprisonment and imposed a six-year ban on holding the office of President of Republika Srpska.¹⁶ Additionally, the judgment triggered automatic legal consequences under Article 203a(5) of the Criminal Code of BiH, including termination of official duties and prohibition from holding public office. This represented a clear assertion of judicial authority over even the highest-ranking entity officials

However, the victory proved initially, somehow, pyrrhic in its implementation. On August 12, 2025, the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina replaced Dodik’s one-year prison sentence with a fine amounting to approximately €18,660.¹⁷ This conversion was legally permissible under Bosnia’s Criminal Code, which allows sentences of up to one year to be commuted to fines.¹⁸ While Dodik avoided imprisonment, the court upheld the six-year ban on holding public office, which proved far more consequential.

The Central Election Commission (CEC) of Bosnia and Herzegovina moved swiftly following the final verdict. Under the BiH Election Law, an elected official’s mandate automatically terminates upon final criminal conviction with a sentence of six months or more.¹⁹ The CEC unanimously decided to revoke Dodik’s mandate ²⁰ and announced early elections for the RS presidency on November 23, 2025.²¹

However, Dodik’s initial response revealed the limitations of judicial authority when confronted with determined political resistance. The National Assembly of Republika Srpska took unprecedented steps to reject state-level authority. On August 22n, 2025, the Assembly called for a referendum scheduled for October 25 2025, in which RS voters would decide whether to accept the decisions of the High Representative Christian Schmidt, the Court of BiH, and the Central Election Commission.²² The Assembly further instructed all RS institutions not to cooperate with the Central Election Commission, effectively declaring institutional rebellion against state-level authority.

The announced referendum represents a direct challenge to Bosnia’s constitutional order. The referendum question would ask voters whether they accept the decisions of state-level institutions. This referendum clearly violates the BiH Constitution, which does not provide for entities to independently organize referendums on decisions of state institutions. This is why the Constitutional Court of BiH has issued an interim measure ²³ on September 10, 2025 suspending these conclusions of the National Assembly of RS.

The Turn in Favor of the Rule of Law  

The Dodik case exposes fundamental tensions within Bosnia’s complex constitutional structure. While the court’s judgement affirmed that the High Representative’s decisions have the force of domestic law and must be respected by entity authorities, the practical enforcement depends on cooperation from entity-level institutions.

The legal framework underpinning the High Representative’s authority derives from Annex 10 of the General Framework Agreement for Peace (Dayton Agreement), ²⁴ relevant UN Security Council resolutions,²⁵ and the Bonn Declaration.²⁶ The Constitutional Court of BiH has consistently held that these authorities are not subject to domestic judicial review.²⁷ The European Court of Human Rights, in Berić and others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina,²⁸ confirmed this interpretation, noting that the High Representative exercises authority derived from Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

Yet the initial standoff demonstrated that legal authority, however well-established, requires institutional capacity for enforcement. When entity authorities refuse to comply with state-level decisions, the effectiveness of the rule of law depends on political will and institutional strength rather than legal clarity alone.

Despite of all institutional shortcomings and political tensions and noise, Dodik in essence complied, in the end, with the decisions of the Court of BiH and CEC of BiH. He transferred his presidential powers to one of the vice-presidents of Republika Srpska, although the legality of this move is questionable since it depends on whether it occurred before or after the judgment against him and such a transfer can only be temporary until the president resumes his duties. At the same time, he has exhausted all available legal remedies before BiH courts (with his appeal before the Constitutional Court still pending), paid the fine, accepted the call for snap elections for a new president, urged the National Assembly to elect an interim president, and his party (SNSD) has already proposed a candidate for that position.²⁹

The Path Forward: Strengthening Rule of Law

Despite challenges, the Dodik judgment represents progress for Bosnia’s rule of law. The court’s willingness to convict a high-ranking official, apply rigorous legal standards, and reject political defences demonstrate judicial independence and commitment to legal principles. The unanimous decision by the Central Election Commission to annul Dodik’s mandate shows institutional courage in upholding constitutional requirements.

However, the case also reveals critical gaps in enforcement mechanisms. Future reforms should consider strengthening the capacity of state-level institutions to ensure compliance with judicial decisions. This might include clearer procedures for removing non-compliant officials and enhanced coordination between judicial and executive authorities.

The international community’s continued support for Bosnia’s judicial institutions remains crucial. The High Representative’s office, whatever its limitations, provides an important backstop when domestic institutions face political pressure. Maintaining this support while gradually transferring authority to domestic institutions represents a delicate balance requiring sustained attention.

The conviction of Milorad Dodik was indeed a hard-fought victory for the rule of law—but the hardest battles for democratic governance lie not only in courtrooms but also in the daily work of building institutions strong enough to enforce decisions. In Bosnia, that work continues.

1. First Instance Judgement of the Court of BiH (available at: https://www.sudbih.gov.ba/Court/Open/15027?n=46070%20-%20Milorad%20Dodik%20i%20drugi_A.pdf
2. The Second Instance Judgement of the Court of BiH (available at: https://www.sudbih.gov.ba/Court/Open/15135?n=Drugostepena%20presuda_Milorad%20Dodik%20i%20drugi_A.pdf)
3. Criminal Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina (“Official Gazette of BiH”, No. 3/2003, 32/2003 -correc., 37/2003, 54/2004, 61/2004, 30/2005, 53/2006, 55/2006, 8/2010, 47/2014, 22/2015, 40/2015, 35/2018, 46/2021, 31/2023 and 47/2023).
4. Decision on amendments to the Criminal Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina, High Representative Decision No. 13/23, dated July 1, 2023. Available here: https://www.ohr.int/decision-enacting-the-law-on-amendments-to-the-criminal-code-of-bosnia-and-herzegovina/#:~:text=Sarajevo%2C%201%20July%202023,in%20some%20other%20unlawful%20way”.
5. Decision Preventing the Entry into Force of the Law on Amendments to the Law on Publication of Laws and Other Regulations of Republika Srpska, No.15/23, dated July 1, 2023 (available at: https://www.ohr.int/decision-preventing-the-entry-into-force-of-the-law-on-amendments-to-the-law-on-publication-of-laws-and-other-regulations-of-republika-srpska/) and Decision Preventing the Entry into Force of the Law on Non-application оf Decisions of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, No.14/23, dated July , 2023 (available at: https://www.ohr.int/decision-preventing-the-entry-into-force-of-the-law-on-non-application-оf-decisions-of-the-constitutional-court-of-bosnia-and-herzegovina/)  
6. Laws adopted by the National Assembly of Republika Srpska on June 21 and June 27, 2023, respectively.
7. Article 1(3), Criminal Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina, defining “public official.” 
8. First Instance Judgement of the Court of BiH, pp.103-105. 
9. Constitutional Court of BiH, Decision U-27/22, March 23, 2023 (especially paras 73-75); Berić and others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, ECtHR (dec), No. 36357/04 et al., ECHR 2007-XII.
10. UN Security Council Resolution 1031 (1995), December 15, 1995. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/201088?ln=en&v=pdf
11. See details in: https://www.ohr.int/appointment-of-the-high-representatives/?print=pdf#:~:text=The%20expression%20of%20support%20by,Page%203%20person%20every%20year. 
12. Constitution of Republika Srpska ( Official Gazette of RS, No. 21/92 – clean version, 28/94, 8/96, 13/96, 15/96, 16/96, 21/96, 21/02, 26/02, 30/02, 31/02, 69/02, 31/03, 98/03, 115/05, 117/05) 
13. First Instance Judgement of the Court of BiH, p.102. 
14. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969.
15. See: Law on Ratification of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in BiH, “Official Gazette of FRY – International Treaties”, No. 12/02, November 21, 2002. 
16. This measure was pronounced in accordance with Article 203a(4) and Article 73 of the Criminal Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
17. “The Court of BIH replaces a prison sentence for Milorad Dodik with a fine”,European Western Balkans, August 13, 2025, https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2025/08/13/the-court-of-bih-replaces-a-prison-sentence-for-milorad-dodik-with-a-fine/. 
18. Article 42a of the Criminal Code of BiH. 
19. Article 1.10 para. (1) item 4,5 and 6  of the Election Law of BiH ( “Official Gazette of BiH”, No. 23/2001, 7/2002, 9/2002, 20/2002, 25/2002 – correc., 4/2004, 20/2004, 25/2005, 77/2005, 11/2006, 24/2006, 33/2008, 37/2008, 32/2010, 48/2011 – CC dec., 63/2011 – CC dec., 18/2013, 7/2014, 31/2016, 54/2017 – CC dec., 41/2020, 38/2022, 51/2022, 67/2022, 24/2024 i 24/2024 – correc.) 
20. CIC Decision from August 8, 2025. Available at: https://www.izbori.ba/Documents/2025/pi_2025_1/od_prestanak_mandata_md-bos.pdf This Decision was on August 18, 2025 upheld by the appellate chamber of the Court of BiH (see more in : https://www.aa.com.tr/ba/politika/sud-bih-odbio-žalbu-na-odluku-cik-a-dodiku-prestao-mandat-predsjednika-rs-a/3662630) 
21. CIC Decision on calling snap elections for the President of RS, available at: https://www.izbori.ba/Documents/2025/pi_2025_1/pi_2025_1_od_rasp_iz-bos.pdf
22. See in : https://www.narodnaskupstinars.net/?q=la/vijesti/narodna-skupština-usvojila-informaciju-i-zaključke-u-vezi-sa-odlukom-cik-bih-o-prestanku-mandata-predsjedniku-republike-srpske-i-odluku-o-raspisivanju-republičkog-referenduma
23. Constitutional Court of BiH, Decision on interim measures U-28/25, available at: https://www.ustavnisud.ba/uploads/odluke/_bs/U-28-25-1495043.pdf 
24. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/default/files/document/files/2024/05/ba951121daytonagreement.pdf 
25. See e.g. UNSC Resolution 1031(1995). In this Resolution the UNSC authorised the establishment of an international administrator for Bosnia and Herzegovina (the High Representative) by an informal group of States actively involved in the peace process (the Peace Implementation Council; “PIC”) as an enforcement measure under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/nanna/record/201088/files/S_RES_1031%281995%29-EN.pdf?withWatermark=0&withMetadata=0&registerDownload=1&version=1 
26. PIC Bonn Conclusions (December 9-10, 1997). Available at: : https://www.ohr.int/pic-bonn-conclusions/?print=pdf. On 19 December 1997 the UNSC endorsed those Conclusions (UNSC Resolution 1144) Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/nanna/record/248211/files/S_RES_1144%281997%29-EN.pdf?withWatermark=0&withMetadata=0&registerDownload=1&version=1
27. See e.g. Constitutional Court of BiH, Decision U-9/00, November 3, 2000.
28. See fn.8., paras 26-28. 
29. See in: https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/drzava-je-pobijedila-dodik-je-izgubio-i-danas-je-to-javno-priznao/250929078